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Financial interlinkage, in the form of cross-holding of equity and debt between ￿rms,
characterize business groups in many countries. We suggest that such ￿nancial interlink-
age can be viewed as a way to solve credit rationing caused by asymmetric information.
If ￿rms possess better information about each other than a bank, then business groups
can be a mechanism to induce ￿rms to sort on the basis of this information. Banks can
oﬀer a menu of contracts that vary in the extent of ￿nancial interlinkage to induce ￿rms
to self-select on the basis of the equilibrium composition of the business groups they can
form.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Business groups feature prominently in the industrial organization of many countries, both
developed and developing. Re￿ecting the widespread prevalence of these organizations is
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1t h ed i v e r s i t yi nt h ew a yt h e ya r ed e ￿ned.1 The ties that bind group ￿rms range from
administrative and ￿nancial linkages to those grounded in family, ethnicity, society, religion
and region. While it is the diversity in these factors that lead to the subtle external diﬀerences
between business groups in diﬀerent countries, a common internal thread is the interlinkage
in equity and debt among the ￿rms that constitute the group. It is this kind of ￿nancial
interlinkage that is the focus of this paper. Our objective here is to present a theory of
business groups based on the cross-holding of equity and debt.
The existence of ￿nancial interlinkages between the constituent ￿rms of a business group
has been widely noted. Previous explanations of these interlinkages have focussed on the
role played by cross-shareholding in either providing risk sharing (see for example Goto, 1982;
Brioschi, Buzzacchi and Colombo, 1989; Nakatani, 1984 and Kali, 1999b), softening inten-
sity of competition between ￿rms in imperfect product markets (see Clayton and Jorgensen
(2000)), or in mitigating moral hazard problems within the group (see Aoki, 1982, and Berglof
and Perotti, 1994).
What has been overlooked is the cross-holding of external debt that often accompanies
the cross-holding of equity among the ￿rms that constitute the business group. Sometimes
referred to as cross-payment guarantees or mutual debt guarantees, these imply that if a
member ￿rm is on the verge of defaulting on an external loan, the other group ￿rms will each
pay a fraction of the defaulting ￿rm￿s external debt provided they are in a position to do so.
Cross-guarantees of this kind are prevalent within business groups in several emerging
economies. In their study of the ￿nancing constraints of Korean chaebols, Shin and Park
(1999) emphasize the role played by intra-group cross-guarantees in supporting external bank
lending.2 Such practices are also prevalent within Chinese business groups. Keister￿s
(2000) extensive study of Chinese business groups describes the importance of mutual debt
1The emphasis is on ￿...an intermediate level of binding ￿ excluding, on the one hand, a set of ￿rms bound
merely by short-term strategic alliances and, on the other, a set of ￿rms legally consolidated into a single one.￿
See Mark Granovetter (1994).
2For example, according to the Bank of (South) Korea, in 1991, cross-payment guarantees by the top ￿ve
chaebol (13 companies) amounted to 19.9 trillion won and by the top 30 chaebol (76 companies) 38.3 trillion
won (1 US Dollar = 1113 Korean Won, June 2000). Samsung￿s three core companies ranked ￿rst, with
combined payment guarantees of 5.8 trillion won, followed by Daewoo￿s core companies with 5.4 trillion won.
See Business Korea, Vol. 9, No. 9, 1992, p. 22.
2relationships in times of ￿nancial adversity and how this eases credit constraints in the absence
of a well-developed ￿nancial market. A recent econometric study by Khanna and Yafeh
(1999) documents the importance of intra-group loans as a mechanism by which group ￿rms
assist each other in times of ￿nancial distress in India. Casteneda￿s (1998) study of Mexican
business groups also notes the existence of loan guarantees among member ￿rms of the
business group. Mutual debt guarantees play an important role in the theory we develop
here, in addition to the cross-holding of equity.
Our theory suggests that business groups that are ￿nancially interlinked through cross-
shareholding and cross-guarantee of loans can be viewed as a way to solve credit rationing
caused by asymmetric information. If all ￿rms possess better information about the types
of some other ￿rms than the bank, then ￿nancially interlinked business groups can be a
mechanism to induce ￿rms to sort on the basis of this information. Consequently, banks can
oﬀer a menu of contracts that vary in the extent of ￿nancial interlinkage to induce ￿rms to
self-select on the basis of the equilibrium composition of the business groups they can form.
By accessing information ￿rms may possess about each other, ￿nancial interlinkage among
business groups can improve eﬃciency in the credit market.3
The starting point for our theory is the well known lemons problem that arises in credit
markets with asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders (see Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981, De Meza and Webb, 1987). In the presence of adverse selection in the credit market,
the equilibrium allocation with standard debt contracts may be ineﬃcient ￿ deserving projects
may not get funded (the underinvestment problem of Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) or undeserving
projects may get funded (the overinvestment problem of De Meza and Webb, 1987). But what
if ￿rms, who are better equipped than outside lenders to judge project riskiness, are allowed to
have cross holding of equity and debt guarantees, thus forming business groups characterized
by ￿nancial interlinkage? In this event, we show that by oﬀering contracts that involve
￿nancial interlinkage along with standard debt contracts, lenders can induce borrowers to
form groups that display assortative matching and self-select among these contracts. In
3It is important to emphasize that our focus is on reciprocal shareholding and debt guarantees that are
the pattern among horizontal groups. This is distinct from a uni-directional chain of shareholding as in a
pyramidal structure. There is an extensive literature on pyramidal structures. See, for example Wolfenzon
(1999), Bebchuk et. al. (1998) and La Porta et. al. (1999).
3particular, in the presence of mutual debt guarantees, high risk borrowers will not be able
to induce low risk borrowers to associate with them even if side payments are allowed. The
intuition is simple : while any type of ￿rm will prefer to have a low risk ￿rm in its group,
the value from having a low risk member is strictly higher for low risk ￿rms since they are
themselves less likely to default, and hence more likely to have to pay the debt guarantee
amount for a defaulting member. Business groups are therefore formed of ￿rms with similar
characteristics. This idea is expressed more formally as Proposition 1 of the model.
We then examine the properties of these business groups. Corollary 1 expresses the
￿nding that the iso-cost curves of business groups formed as a result of the positive assortative
matching display the single-crossing property. In particular, for a given reduction in the
interest rate, a low risk ￿rm will be willing to oﬀer a higher debt guarantee on the loans of
its member ￿rms since it has low risk ￿rms in its group. Consequently, an outside lender
can use this property to oﬀer a menu of contracts to sort the business groups by quality of
investment projects. Low risk business groups will pay lower interest rates but engage in a
higher degree of cross-holding than business groups with higher risk projects.
Starting from a situation of where under standard debt contracts projects with negative
social surplus are borrowing, by oﬀering appropriate ￿nancially interlinked contracts, lenders
can exclude these projects from the credit market. Conversely, if ￿rms with low risk projects
do not ￿nd it worthwhile to ￿nance their projects faced with a standard pooled debt contract,
they can be attracted back into the market using ￿nancially interlinked contracts, thereby
enhancing eﬃciency. Proposition 2 expresses this idea.
Mutual debt guarantees are the driving force behind the results mentioned above. We
extend our basic model in two diﬀerent ways to explain mutual equity cross holdings, one
based on mutual monitoring among group members, and the other based on risk sharing.
With these extensions we provide explanations for cross equity holdings and show at the
same time that the assortative matching and screening results in our basic model due to
mutual debt guarantees continue to hold.
Our paper has links to several diﬀerent literatures. It contributes to the understanding
of business groups, a literature that has been recently reinvigorated by the interest in the
industrial organization of developing and transition countries (see Ghemawat and Khanna
4(1998), Khanna and Palepu (1998a) and Kali (1999b)). Within this literature our paper is
closest in spirit to Berglof and Perotti￿s (1994) analysis of the Japanese ￿nancial keiretsu.
Their model focuses on the role of cross-shareholding among ￿rms within a group to provide
the incentive to monitor as well as the means, through reciprocal voting rights and coalition
enforced threats of removal. To guard against the possibility of collusive behavior by the
coalition as whole (namely, no manager exerts eﬀort, and all vote their ￿rms￿ cross holdings
to protect current managerial appointment) the role of external debt from the group bank
is emphasized. Poor pro￿tability results in ￿nancial distress, and the control of the ￿rm
is shifted to the main lender, moving away from mutual governance by cross-shareholders.
Unlike this paper, the main focus of our paper is cross-holding of debt and how it can
resolve adverse selection problems. However, the extension of our baseline model in section
2.3 to is similar to their explanation of cross-holding of equity, although the formal models
are diﬀerent. Their paper analyzes the problem of ex post moral hazard, and how it can be
alleviated in a repeated game set up through cross-holdings of equity which through reciprocal
exchange of voting rights allows ￿rms to punish a manager who shirks. We focus on ex ante
moral hazard in a static model and show how cross-holdings of equity are a way to directly
induce the manager of a ￿rm to monitor the manager of another ￿rm. A recent paper by
Clayton and Jorgensen (2000) provide a diﬀerent explanation for cross-holding of equity than
the ones oﬀered by Berglof and Perotti and our paper. They show that in the presence
of Cournot quantity competition in the product market cross-equity holdings can lead to
higher joint pro￿ts by inducing each ￿rm to internalize the eﬀect of its quantity decision on
the pro￿ts of the other ￿rm. Our result on assortative matching can also be compared to
ar e c e n tp a p e rb yM a t s u s a k a( 2 0 0 0 )t h a tm o d e l st h ed i v e r s i ￿cation decision of ￿rms as a
search problem by which ￿rms seek businesses that are good matches for their capabilities.
The main diﬀerence between these two models is that sorting (between ￿rms) in our model
is induced not by any technological features, but by a contractual feature.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the problem of adverse selection in credit
markets, and the role of collateral and mutual loan guarantees in alleviating this problem.
In the economic history literature, analyzing the banking insurance experience in the U.S.
during the antebellum period and the 1920￿s, Calomiris (1990) ￿nds evidence of mutual
5liability based bank insurance schemes being more successful than others. In the banking
literature, Bester (1987) shows that collateralization of loans can ameliorate adverse selection
problems by screening borrowers by the riskiness of project. In particular, safe borrowers will
be more willing than risky borrowers to oﬀer greater collateral for a given reduction in the
interest rate, because they expect to repay (and hence not lose the collateral) more often. If
borrowers are too poor to oﬀer collateral, then the problem of adverse selection can lead to
ineﬃciencies in the allocation of credit. Inspired by the successful experience of the Grameen
Bank of Bangladesh in lending to poor villagers without any collateral by asking borrowers
to form self-selected groups and making the group members jointly liable for each other￿s
loans, several recent papers in the development economics literature have examined how this
mechanism can solve various informational problems (see Morduch, 1999 for a recent survey).
In particular, joint liability can be used as an instrument to sort borrowers in terms of the
riskiness of their projects (see, for example, Ghatak, 2000). While our paper is similar in
spirit to this literature, there are several diﬀerences. First, joint liability in the context of
micro-lending takes the form of denying future credit to the entire group if any member
defaults, which is quite diﬀerent from cross-holding or mutual guarantee of debt. Second,
there is no cross-holding of equity among borrowers within a group, and we demonstrate here
that assortative matching and sorting is robust to the introduction of equity interlinkage.
Our paper demonstrates that ￿nancial interlinkage through equity and debt crossholding
can be eﬃciency improving in some circumstances. This is in contrast to the minority ex-
propriation view of ￿nancial interlinkage forwarded by the literature on pyramidal structures
(such as La Porta et. al (1999)). However, it is important to note that the environment
we are concerned with involves reciprocal shareholding and debt guarantees while pyramids
are uni-directional chains of shareholding4. A recent paper by Wolfenzon (1999) develops a
theory of pyramidal ownership and its implications for extraction and ￿rm value.5
4Several recent studies (see Khanna (2000)) cast doubt on economists￿ equation of groups and pyramids.
5We also focus solely on ￿nancial interlinkage as a solution to asymmetric information problems in credit,
but there can be, of course, other economic functions that business groups perform. In situations with
imperfect markets for labor and capital, business groups are able to act as surrogate labor markets and
venture capitalists. See Khanna and Palepu (1998a) for more detailed arguments. Further theoretical work
will try to explicitly account for these functions.
6We have organized the remainder of the paper in the following way. Section 2 presents the
basic model and considers various extensions of it. Section 3 explores empirical implications
of the model and concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
We develop a simple static model of adverse selection in the credit market similar to Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) and De Meza and Webb (1987). The economy consists of a continuum of
risk neutral entrepreneurs normalized to unity. Each entrepreneur is the owner of a blueprint
for an investment project that requires a capital outlay for the purchase of productive assets.
These assets can then be combined with entrepreneurial labor to produce a return on the
investment. There is no moral hazard and entrepreneurs supply labor to the project inelas-
tically. Once the capital is in place and the required unit of labor is put in, projects yield
either a high or a low return. We refer to these outcomes as ￿success￿ (S) and ￿failure￿ (F),
respectively. There are two exogenously given types of entrepreneurs characterized by the
probability of success of their projects, pr and ps, where
0 <p r <p s < 1.
Henceforth we will refer to them as ￿risky￿ and ￿safe￿ entrepreneurs. Risky and safe en-
trepreneurs exist in proportions θ and 1−θ in the population. The outcomes of the projects
are assumed to be independently distributed for the same types as well as across diﬀerent
types. The return of a project is R>0 if it is successful and 0 if it fails for both types of
projects. Our formulation of how risky and safe projects diﬀer is similar to De Meza and
Webb (1987). In Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), in contrast, risky and safe projects are assumed
to have the same mean return, but risky projects have a greater spread around the mean.
Our main results extend easily to this case, as we discuss at the end of section 3.
Entrepreneurs have no wealth and hence have to rely on external ￿nance. An entrepreneur
who chooses not to use his blueprint obtains the reservation payoﬀ u.W e u s e t h e t e r m s
entrepreneur and ￿rm interchangeably in the paper. There is a risk neutral external lender
whom we will refer to as a bank that can provide investment ￿nancing to each entrepreneur
at a gross (inclusive of principal) interest rate r. Borrowers have limited liability. So if
7their projects fail, entrepreneurs are liable up to the amount of collateralizable wealth they
possess, which we take to be zero for simplicity. The opportunity cost of capital for the bank
is ρ per loan. We assume it is economically eﬃcient to pursue only safe investment projects:
Assumption 1
psR − u − ρ > 0 >p rR − u − ρ. (1)
Following existing models of adverse selection in the credit market we will focus only on debt
contracts6.
The type of each borrower is unknown to the bank. However, each entrepreneur pos-
sesses some information about a group of other entrepreneurs. Speci￿cally, the type of each
entrepreneur belonging to the same information network is common knowledge within the
network. We could think of each entrepreneur as belonging to such an informational network
because of being a member of a social or ethnic group7.
2.1 The Adverse Selection Problem
In the environment that we have speci￿ed, simple debt contracts may run into the following
type of adverse selection problem. The reasoning is straightforward. Because the bank
cannot identify ex-ante which blueprints are better and which are worse and it will oﬀer a
pooling contract to all entrepreneurs based on the average repayment rate in the population,
p ≡ θpr+(1−θ)ps. Thus the bank will charge an interest rate r =
ρ
p. However, it is possible
that projects that are not worthy of being ￿nanced from the point of view of economic
eﬃciency may be ￿nanced at this interest rate. We assume this condition to hold:
6In this model, there is no diﬀerence between debt and equity contracts. When a borrower fails, she pays
nothing, whereas when she succeeds she pays a positive amount to the bank. Since both types of borrowers
earn the same revenue when their projects succeed, whether the bank is paid a fraction of the success revenue,
or an amount independent of it makes no diﬀerence. In contrast in the Stiglitz and Weiss model, risky and
safe borrowers earn diﬀerent amounts of revenue when their projects succeed. As a result, debt and equity
contracts have diﬀerent implications.









Notice that this condition may hold even when risky projects are unproductive (i.e., prR−
u− ρ < 0) because they are cross-subsidized by safe borrowers. Here the average repayment





















=ﬂ pR − ρ − u = θ(prR − ρ − u)+( 1− θ)(psR − ρ − u). If the
bank had perfect information about the type of a ￿rm, then it would lend to safe ￿rms
only, leading to an average repayment rate of ps and level of expected social surplus would
be (1 − θ)(psR − ρ − u). Given (1), both these are strictly higher than those achieved under
adverse selection. This is the overinvestment problem in credit markets with adverse selection
(De Meza and Webb, 1987). Notice that while social surplus is higher when risky ￿rms are
excluded, welfare comparisons are less clear cut. Safe borrowers are better oﬀ under the full
information allocation (since they have to cross subsidize risky borrowers under the pooling
debt contract), while risky borrowers are strictly worse oﬀ.
2.2 Financial Interlinkage and Assortative Matching
In this section we explain how the cross-holding of equity and debt between ￿rms can be a
solution to the adverse selection problem in the market for credit. A set of ￿rms that are
interlinked through debt and equity in this fashion is what we refer to as a business group.
2.2.1 Assortative Matching and Single Crossing
First we show that for any given interest rate r, ￿rms with debt and equity cross-holding
will always choose business group partners of the same type. That is, the equilibrium in the
group-formation game satis￿es the optimal sorting property,n a m e l y ,￿rms not in the same
business group cannot form a business group without making at least one of them worse oﬀ.
Our proof of this property explicitly allow ￿r m st ob ea b l et om a k es i d ep a y m e n t st oe a c h
other. In principle then, a risky ￿rm can pay a safe ￿rm to join its business group. For
simplicity, we will consider groups of size two8.
8The results generalize to business groups of size more than two.
9Let πij denote the expected payoﬀ of an entrepreneur of type i w h of o r m sab u s i n e s sg r o u p
with an entrepreneur of type j. We focus on symmetric equity stakes here, and consider the
implications of relaxing this assumption in section 2.5. Let α be the share of his own project
returns that he retains; (1 − α) is his stake in his partner￿s ￿rm. Let 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 be the
extent of the liability that a ￿rm in the business group has on a member ￿rm￿s loans. In
the event that a project that an entrepreneur is a shareholder, fails and goes bankrupt, the
entrepreneur will pay a fraction γ of the failed ￿rm￿s debt obligation.
Then,
πij = pipj(α(R − r)+( 1− α)(R − r)) + pi(1 − pj)α(R − r − γr)
+pj(1 − pi)(1 − α)(R − r − γr)
= {R − (1 + γ)r}{αpi +( 1− α)pj} + pipjγr.
Thus, if a risky ￿rm were to switch from forming a business group with a risky partner to
one with a safe partner instead, the expected gain would be:
πrs − πrr =( ps − pr)[(1− α){R − (1 + γ)r} + prγr].
Similarly, if a safe ￿rm were to switch from forming a business group with a safe partner to
one with a risky partner instead, the expected loss would be:
πss − πsr =( ps − pr)[(1− α){R − (1 + γ)r} + psγr].
The question now is whether the gain for the risky entrepreneur from forming a group with the
safe entrepreneur is greater than the loss that the safe entrepreneur incurs from agreeing to
allow risky entrepreneurs to form a group with him. If this is so, then the risky entrepreneurs
can negotiate a bribe for the safe entrepreneurs that will induce them to team with the risky
entrepreneurs and make will both parties better oﬀ. However, since ps >p r,comparing the
two expressions we see that
πss + πrr > πrs + πsr
and therefore business group formation will display positive assortative matching.
10Consequently, like Becker￿s (1981) analysis of the marriage market, entrepreneurs in our
model will form business groups with ￿nancial interlinkage only with those who have a similar
risk pro￿le. The intuition is the following. From the point of view of both types of borrowers,
a safe partner is preferred both because of higher expected returns through cross-shareholding
and lower expected liability on their loans through the cross-guarantee of loans. However, as
far as cross-shareholding is concerned, the gain of a risky type from having a safe partner is
exactly equal to the loss of a safe type from having a risky partner. As a result, with side
payments being possible, ￿rms will be indiﬀerent between choice of partners. However, as far
as cross-guarantee of loans is concerned, a safe ￿rm will have a higher valuation of having a
safe partner in the business group than a risky ￿rm. This is because the bene￿t of having a
safe rather than a risky partner is realized only when a ￿rm does not itself default, and this
probability is high for safe ￿rms. This implies that a risky ￿rm will never ￿nd it pro￿table to
attract a safe ￿rm to be a group member after compensating the latter for the loss of having
ar i s k y￿rm as a partner. We can state the preceding analysis in the form of the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 : Financial interlinkage within business groups in the form of
cross-shareholding and cross-guarantee of loans leads to positive assortative match-
ing in the formation of business groups.
Given assortative matching, in equilibrium the payoﬀ of each type of entrepreneur under
a contract (r,γ) will be,
πii(γ,r)={R − (1 +γ)r}pi + p2
iγr, i = s,r
Hence the iso-cost curve of an entrepreneur of type i in (γ,r) space is represented by pi(1+
γ)r − p2
iγr = k, i = s,r where k is a constant. The slope of an iso-cost curve of an









< 0, i = s,r.
Since ps >p r,t h ei s o - c o s tc u r v ef o rt h es a f ee n t r e p r e n e u ri s￿atter than the iso-cost curve
for the risky entrepreneur in the (γ,r) plane. That is, the iso-cost curves satisfy the single-
11crossing property, which implies that by oﬀering a menu of contracts that vary in terms of
rand γ, banks can induce various business groups to self-select.
Corollary 1 : Iso-cost curves of ￿rms satisfy the single-crossing property in the (γ,r)
plane.
Figure 1 represents these iso-cost curves.
[Figure 1 should be here]
Since the iso-cost curves are negatively sloped, the higher is the interest rate r, the lower
will have to be the degree of cross-guarantee of loans, γ. It also follows that to receive a
small reduction in the interest rate, safe ￿rms would be willing to oﬀer a higher degree of
cross-guarantee than risky ￿rms because they have safe partners.
Banks can use this property to screen ￿rms by oﬀering contracts to business groups that
diﬀer in terms of the interest rate r and the degree of cross-guarantee γ. We show that this
can improve social surplus by driving out risky ￿rms who were not initially borrowing under
the standard debt contract.
Two observations are worth making regarding the assortative matching result and the
single-crossing property before we move on to derive optimal screening contracts. First, our
proof relies only on ￿rms having diﬀerent probabilities of success, and that their types (i.e.,
probabilities of success) are complementary in the payoﬀ function induced by a ￿nancial
interlinkage.9 In particular, it does not depend on whether safe and risky ￿rms have the
same or diﬀerent expected project returns and hence this result extends to the Stigltiz and
Weiss environment as well. Second, and related to the previous observation, the extent of
cross-equity holding plays no role in these proofs as well (i.e., it goes through for every value
of α). Even if there was no cross holding of equity these results would continue to hold.
9That is,
∂2πi,j(r,γ)
∂pi∂pj = γr>0.Technically, this is the reason why positive assortative matching results with
such a contractual form. Becker￿s analysis showed that if the cross partial derivative of the types of agents
are negative, then negative assortative matching results. In the conext of business groups if we allow for a
more general production technology such that member ￿rms have comparative advantage in diﬀerent tasks
(or products) and these enter a joint production function of the group as a whole then we could have positive
or negative assortative matching depending on whether these tasks are strategic complements or substitutes.
12In section 2.3 where we discuss extensions of the current model, we outline two alternative
theories of cross-equity holding, one based on mutual monitoring, and the other on risk-
sharing. In particular, we show that the assortative matching result and the single-crossing
property continues to hold in these extensions.
2.2.2 Optimal Screening Contracts
Next, we derive optimal screening contracts. To do so, ￿rst we need to prove the following
Lemma:
Lemma 1 : If the contracts (γr,r r) and (γs,r s) are incentive-compatible, then
assortative matching will still result in the formation of business groups.
Proof: Suppose not. Then it must be that two heterogeneous groups earn greater joint
pro￿ts by borrowing under any one of the two contracts that are oﬀered (say, (γs,r s))t h a n
two homogeneous groups can earn under the contracts (γr,r r) and (γs,r s), that is:
πrs(γs,r s)+πsr(γs,r s) > πrr(γr,r r)+πss(γs,r s).
By Proposition 1, if the contract (γs,r s) was the only one oﬀered by the bank, assortative
matching would have resulted. That is,
πrr(γs,r s)+πss(γs,r s) > πrs(γs,r s)+πsr(γs,r s).
Together these inequalities imply πrr(γs,r s) > πrr(γr,r r). But that violates the incentive
compatibility constraint for risky ￿rms, a contradiction.¥
Our goal would to be ￿n dap a i ro fc o n t r a c t s(γs,r s) and (γr,r r) such that risky borrowers
do not borrow. Without loss of generality we can take (γr,r r)=( 0 ,
ρ
pr), the same contract
they would be oﬀered under full information. The bank￿s zero-pro￿t condition from lending
to safe borrowers is10:
rsps{1+γs(1 − ps)} = ρ.
10If the bank was a monopolist maximizing its expected pro￿ts then the optimal contracts will be similar
to those derived in this section but they will lie on the respective participation constraints of the borrowers
as opposed to the zero-pro￿t constraints of the bank.





The incentive compatibility constraint of risky borrowers require them to prefer not borrowing
at all to borrowing under the contract (γs,r s):
pr [R − rs{1+γs(1 − pr)}] ≤ u. (4)
Substituting (3) in (4), we get the following condition for the existence of a separating equi-
librium - there exists γs ∈ [0,1] such that




Finally, we need to ensure that another condition is satis￿ed for the optimal cross-
guarantee contract to be feasible, namely, the contract (γs,r s) must satisfy the following
limited liability constraint:
rs(1 + γs) ≤ R.
Using (3) this condition can be written as:
(1 + γs)
ps{1+γs(1 − ps)}
ρ ≤ R. (6)
This guarantees that a ￿rm cannot make any transfers to the bank when its project fails,
and that the sum of its own liability and the liability for member ￿rms of the business group
it belongs to through cross-guarantees, r(1+γ), cannot exceed the realized revenue from the














Observe that Assumptions 1 and 2 are implied by this assumption.11 Recall that these
assumptions implied that safe projects generate positive social surplus, risky projects generate
11This is not obvious for the part of Assumption 1 that says prR<ρ + u. I nt h ep r o o fo fL e m m a2b e l o w
we show that
pr(2−pr)
ps(2−ps) < 1 and so prR<
pr(2−pr)
ps(2−ps)ρ + u implies prR<ρ + u.
14negative social surplus, and under a standard debt contract risky borrowers borrow. Then
we are able to prove:
Lemma 2 : Suppose Assumption 3 holds. Then there exists a pair of contracts (γs,r s)
and (γr,r r) that satisfy the zero-pro￿t condition of the bank and the limited liability constraint
such that risky borrowers do not borrow.
Proof: See the appendix.
The solution to the optimal separating problem will not in general be unique. We
prove that there exists a critical value of the degree of optimal cross holding of debt for safe
borrowers, ￿ γ ∈ (0,1] such that for any γs ≥ ￿ γ there exists a corresponding interest rate for
safe borrowers, rs from the bank￿s zero pro￿t condition such that the incentive compatibility
constraint of risky borrowers, and the limited liability constraint are satis￿ed. At the same
t i m e ,s ol o n ga sA s s u m p t i o n3i ss a t i s ￿ed it is possible to oﬀe rap a i ro fc o n t r a c t ss u c h
that only safe ￿rms get to borrow by forming business groups with cross-shareholding and
cross-guarantee of loans and risky ￿rms do not receive loans.12






lie on the respective zero-pro￿t equations, the
expected payoﬀ of a safe ￿rm is equal to (psR−u−ρ) and the repayment rate is equal to ps.
Hence the average repayment rate and social surplus under this pair of contracts are equal
to their full-information levels and strictly higher than those under ordinary debt contracts.
The main result of this section readily follows:
Proposition 2: If parameters satisfy Assumption 3, ￿nancial interlinkage within
business groups in the form of cross-shareholding and cross-guarantee of loans will
increase expected social surplus and repayment rates compared to standard debt
12A counterfactual implication of this model is that no ￿rm borrows under a standard debt contract. In
order to highlight the potential eﬃciency gains from ￿nancially interlinked business groups using the simplest
possible model, we assumed there are only two types of borrowers, with risky borrowers having ineﬃcient
projects. This assumption can be readily relaxed to allow a third type of borrower : risky borrowers who have
eﬃcient projects. Then under the optimal screening contracts, risky borrowers who have eﬃcient projects will
borrow under the standard debt contract.
15contracts.
It is straightforward to extend this result to an environment where adverse selection leads
to the exclusion of safe projects with positive net surplus from the market as in Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) rather than the form of ineﬃciency we focus on (i.e., risky projects with negative
net surplus receiving loans). As observed before, Proposition 1, Corollary 1 and Lemma 1 do
not depend on the distribution of revenues of the projects and hence these results continue
to apply. The key diﬀerence between these two set ups lies in which type of borrower￿s
participation constraint binds. In the above model, safe types have a higher expected payoﬀ
for any given contract, and so it is the participation constraint of risky borrowers that we focus
on. However, if both types of projects have the same mean returns then safe borrowers have
a lower expected payoﬀ under a standard pooling debt contract. This is because, expected
interest payments to the bank are higher for safe borrowers since they pay back the same
amount more often than risky borrowers, while expected revenues are by assumption the
same. Hence it is possible that under standard debt contracts, the participation constraint of
safe borrowers may not be satis￿ed and only risky borrowers will borrow at an interest rate of
ρ
pr.I f￿nancially interlinked contracts are allowed, the bank can oﬀer two contracts, (rs,γs)
and (
ρ
pr,0) such that safe borrowers will choose the former, and risky borrowers will choose
the latter. Notice that the welfare implication of ￿nancial interlinkage is quite diﬀerent in this
case. Financially interlinked contracts would attract safe ￿rms back into the market, while
risky borrowers would continue to borrow under debt contracts. As a result, the welfare of
safe borrowers, social surplus and repayment rates would all be higher, but risky borrowers
will be no worse oﬀ. In contrast, in the basic model social surplus and the welfare of safe
borrowers are higher but risky borrowers are strictly worse oﬀ with ￿nancial interlinkage.
2.3 Optimal Cross Holding of Equity
The main results in the previous section were driven by the cross-holding of debt. How much
a ￿rm values having a safe ￿rm in its group was positively correlated with its own type due
to cross-holding of debt, leading to assortative matching in the formation of business groups.
This in turn allowed banks to exclude risky ￿rms with ineﬃcient projects from borrowing
16which may not have been possible with standard debt contracts. However, cross equity
holding is a prominent characteristic of business groups across the world, and the extent
of cross-equity holding played no role in the results of the previous section. In this section
we address the issue of determining the optimal degree of cross holding of equity using two
alternative models. The ￿rst is based on mutual monitoring, and the second on risk sharing.
2.3.1 Mutual Monitoring
Consider a simple extension of our basic model where the probability of success of each type of
project depends on, apart from an intrinsic quality component, the eﬀort put in by managers
of ￿rms within a business group. In particular, the probability of success of the i-th type
of project is now pi =ﬂ pi + a + b where ﬂ ps > ﬂ pr , a ∈ [0,ﬂ a] is the eﬀort level chosen by the
m a n a g e ro fa￿rm, and b ∈ [0,ﬂ b] is the eﬀort level chosen by the manager of its partner ￿rm
respectively. A suﬃcient condition for pi < 1for i = r,s is ﬂ a+ﬂ b<1−ﬂ ps. The key assumption
is a and b are unobservable among the managers of the ￿rm, and to the bank. Also, these
eﬀorts are subject to some disutility cost, which are taken to be quadratic for simplicity :
1
2c1a2 and 1
2c2b2.The eﬀo r to ft h em a n a g e ro fa￿rm devoted to the project of a ￿rm that is
a member of the same business group can be interpreted as monitoring eﬀort, or help.13 We
show that (a) cross-equity holding can work as an optimal incentive device to elicit eﬀort (or
other non-contractible resources) from other group members, and (b) cross-holding of debt
can still be used as a screening device when the eﬀort levels are endogenous.
Consider a given cross-holding of debt and equity contract (r,γ,α), and a group consisting
of two types of ￿rms, i and j. We show that for any given contract (r,γ,α)the assortative
matching result still goes through when the eﬀort levels are endogenous. Next, we show how
a bank can screen borrowers by oﬀering contracts that diﬀer in the extent of cross-holding of
debt and equity. For ￿rm i the decision problem is to
max
{ai,bi}









where pi(ai,b j)=ﬂ pi + ai + bj and pj(aj,b i)=ﬂ pj + aj + bi. We focus on the choice of eﬀort
13The latter interpretation is favored by Itoh (1991). The moral hazard part of our story is similar to his
model.
17levels by group members that constitute a Nash equilibrium.14 Solving for the optimal values
of ai and bi we get
ai =
α{R − r(1 + γ)} + γrpj
c1
bi =
(1 − α){R − r(1 + γ)} + γrpi
c2
.
Substituting the values of ai and bj in pi and that of aj and bi in pj we get
pi =ﬂ pi + A + Bpj
pj =ﬂ pj + A + Bpi
where A ≡ {R − r(1 + γ)}{ α
c1 + 1−α
c2 } and B ≡ γr{ 1
c1 + 1
c2}. Simultaneously solving we get,
pij =
1
1 − B2{A(1 + B)+ﬂ pi + Bﬂ pj}.
where pij is the probability of success for type i when it￿s business group partner is of type j.
In the choice of the optimal contracts we need to make sure that γ and r satisfy the condition
B<1in order to have pij > 0.
It is to be noted that the amount of eﬀort supplied by the manager of ￿rm ion her own
project depends on the type of project its partner ￿rm j has because of the presence of cross
guarantee. If ￿rm j is very likely to fail, then ￿rm i has lower incentives to supply eﬀort to its
own project because of the higher level of expected cross guarantee payments. In contrast,
the eﬀort supplied by the manager of ￿rm ion the project of its partner ￿rm j is increasing
in her own type. If ￿rm i is more likely to succeed, then ￿rm j￿s expected cross guarantee
payments are lower. Since ￿rm i gets a share of ￿rm j￿s pro￿ts, her incentives to supply
monitoring or helping eﬀort is higher.
It is straightforward to check that Proposition 1 goes through, i.e., πss +πrr > πrs+πsr.
The proof is in the appendix. The only diﬀerence from the previous section is now the
probability of success of a ￿rm depends not only on its own type (as before) but also on the
type of the ￿rm that it is grouped with. As before, the value of having a safe ￿rm as partner
is higher for a safe ￿rm because it is more likely to be in a position to make cross guarantee
14Since these eﬀorts are unobservable to group members, we do not have to worry about the possibility of
collusion.
18payments. Moreover, in this case, its own probability of success is higher if it has a safe
partner through the choice of eﬀort which reinforces the former eﬀect.
For a given (r,γ) we can derive the optimal value of α by maximizing the payoﬀ of a
representative i-type borrower with respect to α. The relevant condition is (see the appendix
for details):
{R − r(1 + γ)}α + piiγr




















Notice that the right hand side is increasing in c2 and decreasing in c1, while the left hand
side is increasing in α. Also, for c1 = c2, α = 1
2. It immediately follows that α > 1
2 if c2 >c 1
and α < 1
2 if c2 <c 1. Intuitively, if eliciting own eﬀort is less costly than eliciting monitoring
eﬀort (i.e., c1 is lower than c2)the level of equity holding should be higher in own ￿rms than
in a partner ￿rm, and conversely, if c1 is higher than c2. The next step of our analysis will
be simpli￿ed if we assume that the diﬀerence between c1 and c2 is not very large, so that α
is in the neighborhood of 1
2.
We can show that there exists a pair of ￿nancially interlinked contract (rs,γs,αs) and
(rr,γr,αr) such that risky projects with negative net surplus that were being funded under
a standard pooling debt contracts can be excluded. The proof is in the appendix.
2.3.2 Risk Sharing
An alternative way to derive optimal cross-equity holdings is one using a risk-sharing model.
Let us retain our basic model of section 2 and add the feature that the borrowers are risk
averse and there is no market insurance available. Then eﬃcient risk sharing dictates that
￿rms within a business group would smooth their income streams by holding claims on each
other￿s project￿s returns.
The expected payoﬀ of a borrower of type i w h of o r m sab u s i n e s sg r o u pw i t hab o r r o w e r
of type j is now:
πij = pipju(R − r)+pi(1 − pj)u(α(R − r(1 + γ))) + (1 − pi)pju((1 − α)(R − r(1 + γ))).
F a c e dw i t ha n yc o n t r a c t(r,γ),any two ￿rms would optimally share risk by choosing α = 1
2,
which follows from maximizing πij+πji with respect to α. Intuitively, risk sharing within the
19group implies having the same income in each state of the world. Given this we show that the
assortative matching and single-crossing properties still apply. In particular, the expected
gain of a risky borrower from having a safe partner is pr(ps − pr){u(R − r) − u(
R−r(1+γ)
2 )}
while the expected loss of a safe borrower from having a risky partner is ps(ps − pr){u(R −
r) − u(
R−r(1+γ)
2 )}. T h ef o r m e ri sl e s sa sps >p r. Given assortative matching, the expected
payoﬀ of a type i borrower:
πii = p2
iu(R − r)+2 pi(1 − pi)u
￿
R − r(1 + γ)
2
¶














It is clear upon inspection, that indiﬀerence curves still satisfy the single-crossing property.
From this the proof of Proposition 2 can be straightforwardly adapted to show that a pair of
screening contracts exist such that only safe borrowers borrow in equilibrium.
2.4 Other Extensions
In the basic model we assumed that shocks facing ￿rms are perfectly uncorrelated. Our model
can be extended to allow for partial correlation in these shocks. However, if these shocks are
perfectly correlated then cross-holding of debt will not have any real eﬀect and our results
will no longer hold. If all ￿rms within the business group fail, then there will be no debt
repayment, nor any cross-guarantee payments. Conversely, if they all succeed, there is no need
for any cross-guarantee payments. Hence shocks facing ￿rms within a business group must
have an idiosyncratic component for business groups to solve the adverse selection problem.
This assumption is justi￿ed by the fact that most business groups tend to be diversi￿ed or
heterogeneous in terms of their businesses.15
The assumption of competitive credit markets is without loss of generality. If the bank
was a monopolist maximizing its expected pro￿ts then the optimal contracts will be similar to
15Fisman￿s (2001) paper on political connections in Indonesia is an example of a situation when shocks could
be correlated.
20those derived in the basic model but they will lie on the respective participation constraints
of the ￿rms as opposed to the zero-pro￿t constraints of the bank.
Cross-holdings of debt and equity in our model are symmetric within a business group.
We allow borrowers to diﬀer in terms of a single characteristic, namely, the riskiness of their
projects and show that borrowers are going to sort in terms of this single characteristic. This
leads to perfectly homogeneous groups, and hence, symmetric contracts. In reality these
contracts are often asymmetric: ￿rm A may hold a share of αA on its own returns, while
￿rm B may hold αB 6= αA of its own returns. The same is possible regarding the extent
of cross-holdings of debt, γ. A separate source of heterogeneity other than riskiness can be
added to the model to generate asymmetric contracts within groups. A complete analysis of
the issue of multi-dimensional heterogeneity is beyond the scope of the current paper, and so
we limit ourselves to the following example based on the mutual monitoring model. Suppose
after groups are formed and contracts are signed (so that re-grouping is not feasible) each
￿rm receives a mutually observable shock to the cost of monitoring with some probability.
In particular, the cost of monitoring its partner ￿rm becomes very high (i.e., c2 →∞ ) for a
￿rm aﬀected by this shock. Then there will be some business groups for which the members
(say, A and B) will have diﬀerent costs of monitoring (i.e., cA
2 <c B
2 ) and hence the optimal
equity cross-holdings would be asymmetric (i.e, αA ’ 1 > αB).16
In our model we assume that borrowers have no wealth at all which is clearly an unrealistic
assumption. Suppose borrowers have some wealth w>0. In that case the bank would ask
borrowers to pledge some collateral which is taken away if the project fails. If this wealth
level is high enough, the use of collateral will be suﬃcient to screen out risky borrowers.
For our results to go through all that is needed is a binding limited liability constraint that
implies even if collateral is used, risky borrowers still prefer to borrow under a standard debt
contract.
16Other potential sources of heterogeneity are the pro￿tability of the ￿rm (R), how much wealth a ￿rm can
put up as collateral (or, conversely how much capital is needed), and risk aversion.
213 Empirical Implications
The analyses of the previous sections suggest ways to interpret existing empirical literature
in the area and avenues for further empirical research. In this section we outline some of
these ideas.
The model suggests that the cost of borrowing should be correlated across group members
and that the degree of cross holding should be negatively correlated with the cost of borrowing.
We believe these implications are potentially testable, using data on emerging market business
groups.
For instance, several of the prominent business groups in countries such as South Korea
and Mexico, where the prevalence of cross-guarantees have been noted, borrow funds on the
international debt market and consequently have been assigned international risk assessments
(ratings) by investment advisory ￿rms (such as Moody￿s Global Investor Service). The
interest rate that these groups pay on such debt is also public information. Only information
on the extent of intra-group cross-liability is not available from public sources, but in principle
should be obtainable. This would then allow the testing of the implications with regard to
positive assortative matching in the formation of business groups and the screening of such
groups by external lenders.
Another interesting implication of our theory for the study of business groups is their
hierarchy, which is a hitherto unexplored dimension to such organizations.17 If, as the theory
suggests, business groups are constituted of ￿rms with similar quality characteristics, then
at ￿rst blush, we would expect this to mean that actual groups should be comprised of ￿rms
producing similar products. And indeed, we can use this interpretation to understand actual
business groups composed of ￿rms operating in similar markets.18 But how can we explain
the existence of business groups comprised of ￿r m se n g a g e di nv e r yd i v e r s i ￿ed markets?19
17It should be noted, however, that this implication is not unique to the speci￿c mechanism for positive
assortative matching suggested in this paper.
18Such as Grupo Cemex of Mexico, which has ￿rms engaged in the production of cement, contracting for
bridge and building construction and ancilliary construction materials.
19For example, the House of Tata in India has interests in steel, watches, detergents, tea, automobiles, and
computer software. Grupo Luksic of Chile has interests in banks, hotels, mining, beer and pasta. Grupo
Carso of Mexico has ￿rms in telecoms, internet services, television, department stores and ￿nance. See ￿When
22There are two answers to this. First, while these ￿rms may be engaged in very diﬀerent
markets, their activities could be similar in terms of the quality dimension.20 Second,
diversi￿cation in activities make the shocks facing group members less likely to be correlated.
And, the eﬀect of cross debt guarantees on eﬃciency crucially depends on the shocks being
not perfectly correlated. If they were perfectly correlated - cross debt guarantees would never
bite. Either all ￿rms succeed, in which case there is no need to pay up loan guarantees for
am e m b e r￿rm, or all ￿rms default, in which case there is nobody to pay loan guarantees.
This perspective leads to a related implication. We can rank business groups according to
the quality of their projects, suggesting a quality-based hierarchy. In fact, in many countries
we do observe a class hierarchy of business groups, from the so called ￿blue-chip￿ groups and
on down the ladder. In combination with the previous interpretation this implies that we
should expect to observe this kind of hierarchy both among groups of related ￿rms as well
as among groups formed of diversi￿ed ￿rms. Testing this would imply obtaining risk ratings
on both group-member ￿rms as well as the overall group. For prominent business groups in
several emerging economies, one should be able to obtain or construct such indices.
The above observation is related to another robust recent empirical ￿nding in the business
group literature. Studies covering various countries (see Khanna, (2000) for an excellent
survey) ￿nd that ￿rms associated with business groups show better ￿nancial performance
a n dp r o d u c t i v i t ya sw e l la sb e t t e rr i s ks h a r i n gt h a nu n a ﬃliated ￿rms. While these may
be explained by the presence of better mutual monitoring and risk sharing among business
groups, our paper suggests the possibility of reverse causality. In particular, low risk and
high productivity ￿rms are precisely those that are likely to form business groups.
Recent empirical work on Chilean business groups by Khanna and Rivkin (1999) ￿nds
that equity interlocks explain a limited amount of covariance between earnings of business
group members. This suggests there are other mechanisms of ￿nancial interlinkage that
contribute to the observed covariance, such as debt guarantees or intra-group loans, which
eight arms are better than one,￿ The Economist, Sept. 12, 1998, pp. 67-68.
20Thus, although the House of Tata in India has interests in very diversi￿ed markets (steel, watches, deter-
gents, tea, automobiles, and computer software) they are all perceived to be similar in terms of quality. In
this case, relatively high quality since TATA is considered a ￿blue-chip￿ brand. See Khanna, T., Palepu, K.
and Danielle Melito Wu (1998) for more details on Tata.
23are the main focus of this paper.21 Our paper suggests that future empirical work should
pay greater attention to these alternative instruments of ￿nancial interlinkage.
An implication of the model is that if an economy is very networked and ￿rms have
access to good information about each other, ￿nancially interlinked debt contracts of the kind
described in the paper should improve repayment rates. On the other hand, in economies with
low levels of networking such contracts should reduce repayment rates. In a large economy
such as India, it is well known that some business communities (such as the Marwaris) have
much stronger close-knit networks than others. In principle it should be possible to obtain
information on business groups composed of members of these communities and repayment
rates on loans to test this implication.
Our results imply that the cross-holding of debt can be interpreted as a way to ameliorate
adverse selection problems in the credit market (in the absence of collateral), while cross-
holding of equity provides incentives to mitigate moral hazard problems. It is unlikely
that either type of cross-holding by itself will solve both types of asymmetric information
problems. Therefore, cross equity and cross debt holding arrangements may or may not go
together depending on whether both kinds of asymmetric problems are prevalent or not in a
given economy. Empirically, this suggests we might be able to use the presence or absence
of each of these types of arrangements, together with the presence or absence of collateral,
as a marker for the kind of asymmetric information problem that is more serious in a given
economy.
The only role played by equity in our theory is as a device to elicit monitoring eﬀort,
or to share risk. Debt has been the sole instrument available to ￿rms for obtaining needed
investment ￿nance. This of course, ignores the important role that the sale of shares play in
raising external funds. But the raising of capital through the sale of equity depends crucially
on the existence of a well functioning stock market and associated ￿nancial intermediation.
A principal activity of these institutions is in fact the gathering and processing of information
about ￿rms, thereby easing the asymmetric information that is at the heart of our approach.
In many emerging and transition economies, the ￿nancial sector is still in a state of under-
21The paper by Lincoln, Gerlach and Ahmadjian (1996) also ￿nds evidence of business groups functioning
as redistributive income smoothing mechanisms.
24development. Specialized ￿nancial intermediaries that perform informational and monitoring
services are absent, or there is a serious lack of skills and incentives of such intermediaries
that do exist22. Stock markets do not work well. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that
in many developing countries, stockmarkets, such as they do exist, are atrophied, with lim-
ited ￿otation and few listed ￿rms (see Gonzalo Castaæeda (1999) for the Mexican case and
Katherina Pistor (1999) for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). Our model ￿ts into
such environments. Conversely, as the ￿nancial sector develops and information problems in
the economy become less severe, we should expect to observe an unraveling of the kinds of
ties that bind group ￿rms that we have focused on in this paper. This may be one way to
understand why such business groups are rare in developed countries such as the U.S..
In a related vein, the past three years of ￿nancial crisis in South Korea may provide a
laboratory to test our theory. As mentioned earlier, the clearest examples of debt and equity
interlinkage come from the Korean chaebols. It is conceivable that the recent aggregate
economic shock has also had idiosyncratic eﬀects at the ￿rm level that have altered the
distribution of riskiness across Korean ￿rms. In terms of our model, this means that the
￿type￿ of some ￿rms may have changed, which would imply a change in the composition
of groups. As we might expect in consequence, there is currently underway a process of
unraveling of existing relationships and restructuring of many of the large Korean business
groups23. Once the economy stabilizes, it should be possible to examine whether the new
groupings re￿ect a diﬀerent distribution of riskiness across ￿rms the way our assortative
matching result suggests.
Recent cross-country empirical work across a spectrum of emerging economies24 by Ajit
Singh (1995) shows that in developing countries, external ￿nance takes precedence as a source
of funds for ￿rms. This is the reverse of the ￿pecking order￿ pattern of ￿nance found in
advanced economies whereby the latter mostly use retained pro￿ts to ￿nance their investment
needs, followed by long term debt, with equity ￿nance only as a last resort. Consequently,
since ￿rms in emerging economies are compelled to look toward external ￿nance, credit
22For a theory of this, see Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole, (1993). For empirical work, see Tarun Khanna
and Krishna Palepu (1998d).
23See for instance the article ￿Entrepreneurial fresh air￿ in The Economist, Jan 11th 2001.
24India, Republic of Korea, Jordan, Pakistan, Thailand, Mexico, Malaysia, Turkey and Zimbabwe.
25rationing is likely to be a serious problem on account of the absence of adequate ￿nancial
intermediation in these economies. Our analysis suggests that ￿nancially interlinked business
groups can be interpreted as a solution to this problem.
26Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a2
It is easy to verify that the left hand side of (6) is an increasing function of γs and assumes
the value 2
ps(2−ps)ρ for γs =1 . Similarly, the right hand side of (5) is an increasing function
of γs and assumes the value
pr(2−pr)





ps{1+γs(1−ps) . As R>
ρ
ps (by (1)), for γs =0condition (6) is
satis￿ed with strict inequality and so it also holds for γs small enough. However, for γs =0
condition (5) cannot hold as it is equivalent to the condition prR − u ≤
pr
psρ,which is ruled
out by Assumption 2 (equation 2) that says there is some ineﬃciency under standard debt
contracts. A necessary condition for the existence of a γs ∈ [0,1] that satis￿es (5) is
pr(2 − pr)
ps(2 − ps)
ρ ≥ prR − u.
Note that the expression x(2 − x)is increasing in xfor x ∈ [0,1].Therefore pr(2 − pr) <
ps(2 − ps) and the assumption that prR − u<ρ in Assumption 1 (equation 1) is not
suﬃcient to ensure the above condition will hold. However, while necessary, this condition
is not suﬃcient as we have to check whether (6) is satis￿ed as well. There are two cases
two consider. If (6) is satis￿ed for γs =1 , which will be the case if R ≥ 2
ps(2−ps)ρ then it is
satis￿ed for all γs ∈ [0,1] a n ds ow eh a v ep r o v e dt h ee x i s t e n c eo fac r i t i c a lv a l u e￿ γ ∈ (0,1)
such that for all γs ≥ ￿ γ a screening contract exists. Suppose R< 2
ps(2−ps)ρ instead. Then
there exists a γs ∈ (0,1) such that (6) holds with equality. This value of γs is ￿ γ ≡
psR−ρ
ρ−ps(1−ps)R.
Note that as by assumption R< 2
ps(2−ps)ρ in this case, ￿ γ ∈ (0,1). A necessary and suﬃcient
condition for a screening contract to exist in this case is ￿ γ must satisfy (5). Straightforward




ru. Observe that as ps >p r this condition is
consistent with (1) which requires psR>ρ + u. This completes the proof.
The Mutual Monitoring Case.
P r o o fo fA s s o r t a t i v eM a t c h i n g
The expected payoﬀ of a ￿rm of type i which has a type j ￿rm in its group when facing
the contract (r,γ,α)is:









27where pij = 1
1−B2{A(1+B)+ﬂ pi+Bﬂ pj},a i =
α{R−r(1+γ)}+γrpji






















since B = rγ( 1
c1 + 1
c1) < 1by assumption. Since the types of borrowers are complementary in
the payoﬀ functions, the assortative matching result follows directly from Becker (1993, Ch.
4).
Derivation of the Optimal Value of α
Since groups are homogeneous, the direct eﬀect of a change in α cancels out. By the
envelope theorem, we can ignore the eﬀect of a change in α on πii through variations in the
level of the own eﬀort level of a given ￿rm. Rather, the choice of α i sb a s e do ni t se ﬀect on
the other ￿rm￿s eﬀort level. Diﬀerentiating πii with respect to α and using this fact we get:
[{R − r(1 + γ)}α + piiγr]
∂bi
∂α































condition in the text follows.
Proof of Existence of Separating Contracts
Notice that Lemma 1 applies with a minor modi￿cation : if incentive compatible con-
tracts (rs,γs,αs) and (rr,γr,αr) exist, then assortative matching still takes place. The proof
consists of four steps.
Step 1 : Take a given value of α ∈ (0,1) throughout this analysis. Consider a contract
(r,γ) such that the bank makes zero expected pro￿ts if only safe borrowers borrow under
that contract. By construction,
rpss{1+( 1− pss)γ} = ρ.
We want to show that under some conditions, if risky borrowers were to borrow under this
contract, their expected payment to the bank would be higher compared to safe borrowers.
Notice that both pss and prr depend on the speci￿c contract (r, γ) through endogenous eﬀort
choice. The condition that
rprr{1+( 1− prr)γ} >r p ss{1+( 1− pss)γ}
28simpli￿es to







Clearly, this condition cannot hold for γ =0 . However, for a high enough value of γ this
condition will be satis￿ed. For example, when γ =1 ,this condition is equivalent to ﬂ ps+ﬂ pr >
‡
3
2 − 2 A
1−B
·
(1−B). Since B<1 and A
1−B < 1 by assumption, this condition will be satis￿ed
for a range of values of ﬂ ps and ﬂ pr.
Step 2: In the previous step we considered only a part of the expected payoﬀ of a
￿rm, namely, the expected payment to the bank. Consider the remaining component of the





consider a contract (r, γ) such that the bank makes zero expected pro￿ts if only safe borrowers
borrow under that contract, i.e., rpss{1+( 1− pss)γ} = ρ. Consider a simple debt contract
(r0,0) such that pssr0 = ρ. We wish to show that ￿ πrr(r, γ,α) < ￿ πrr(r0,0,α), i.e.,























c1 and bi =
(1−α){R−r(1+γ)}+γrpii
c2 are the eﬀort choices of a ￿rm of
type i under the contract (r,γ) while ￿ ai =
α(R−r0)
c1 and ￿ bi =
(1−α)(R−r0)
c2 are eﬀort choices of
a ￿rm of type i under the contract (r0,0). Since eﬀort levels are lower than what would be
achieved if these were contractible (namely, a∗ = R
c1 and b∗ = R
c2)i fw ec a ns h o wt h a t￿ ar >a r
and ￿ br >b r the proof will be complete. That is, we require
α{r(1 + γ) − r0} − γrprr > 0
(1 − α){r(1 + γ) − r0} − γrprr > 0
Recall that by construction, rpss{1+( 1− pss)γ} = pssr0. Therefore, r(1 + γ) − r0 = γrpss >
γrprr.Hence so long as min{α,1−α}pss >p rr this condition will be satis￿e d .S ol o n ga sﬂ ps is
large enough compared to ﬂ pr and α is neither too close to 1 or too close to 0 this condition
will be satis￿ed. Since we assume c1 and c2 are close enough, we are guaranteed that α does
not take extreme values.
Step 3 : We must make sure that safe borrowers are strictly better oﬀ under the contract
(r,γ) compared to the contract (r0,0). Step 1 already shows that their expected payment to
the bank is the same. Now we look at the remaining component of their payoﬀ, ￿ πss. The
29argument is similar to the one used in step 2, but the aim is exactly the opposite. Now we
want to show that ￿ as <a s and ￿ bs <b s whereas previously we wanted to show that ￿ ar >a r and
￿ br >b r.Since α{r(1+γ)−r0}−γrpss = −(1−α)γrpss < 0 and (1−α){r(1+γ)−r0}−γrpss =
−αγrpss < 0, our proof is complete.
Step 4: Starting with a situation where risky borrowers borrowing under a standard
pooling debt contract (r0,0), suppose the contract (r, γ) is oﬀered. Safe borrowers will be
better oﬀ, and under come parameter conditions risky borrowers will be strictly worse oﬀ.I f
the expected payoﬀ of risky borrowers, πrr falls below u then they will withdraw from the
credit market, thereby improving eﬃciency.
30References
[1] Akerlof, G. (1970), ￿The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mech-
anism,￿ Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84.
[2] Aoki, M. (1982), ￿Business Groups in a Market Economy,￿ European Economic Review,
19: pp. 3-70.
[3] Bebchuk, L., Kraakman, R. and Triantis, G. (1998), ￿Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership,
and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control From
Cash Flow Rights, ￿ Mimeo. Harvard Law School.
[4] Becker, G. (1993). AT r e a t i s eo nt h eF a m i l y . Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
[5] Berglof, E. and Perotti, E. (1994), ￿The governance structure of the Japanese ￿nancial
keiretsu,￿ Journal of Financial Economics, 36, pp. 259-284.
[6] Brioschi, F., Buzzacchi, L. and Colombo, M. (1989), ￿Risk Capital Financing and the
Separation of Ownership and Control In Business Groups,￿ Journal of Banking and
Finance, 13, pp. 747-772.
[7] Calomiris, C. (1990), ￿Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective,￿ Jour-
nal of Economic History, 50, 283-295.
[8] Castaæeda, G. (1998), ￿La Empresa Mexicana y Su Gobierno Corporativo￿ (The Mexican
Firm and its Corporate Governance), Alter Ego/UDLAP Press.
[9] Castaæeda, G. (1999), ￿Laggard Economic Growth and Ill-Functioning Stock Markets,￿
Mimeo, Universidad de Las Americas-Puebla, Mexico.
[10] Clayton, M. J. and Jorgensen, B. N. (2000), ￿Cross Holding and Imperfect Product
Markets,￿ Mimeo, Harvard Business School.
[11] De Meza, D. and Webb, D. (1987) ￿Too Much investment: A Problem of Asymmetric
Information,￿ Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 102, No. 2, pp. 281-292.
31[12] Fisman, R. (2001), ￿Estimating the Value of Political Connections,￿ Forthcoming in
American Economic Review.
[13] Ghatak, M. (2000), ￿Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and
the Peer Selection Eﬀect. ￿ Economic Journal, Vol. 110, No. 465, pp. 601-631.
[14] Ghemawat, P. and Khanna, T. (1998), ￿The Nature of Diversi￿ed Business Groups: A
Research Design and Two Case Studies,￿ Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume 66,
No. 1. pp. 35-61.
[15] Goto, A. (1982), ￿Business Groups In A Market Economy,￿ European Economic Review,
19, pp. 53-70.
[16] Granovetter, M. (1994), ￿Business Groups,￿ in T h eH a n d b o o ko fE c o n o m i cS o c i o l o g y
edited by Smelser, N.J. and Swedberg, R. Princeton University Press.
[17] Holmstrom, B. and Tirole, J. (1993), ￿Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring,￿
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 101, No. 4, pp. 679-707.
[18] Itoh, H. (1991) , ￿Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations￿, Econometrica,V o l .5 9 ,
No.3, pp. 611-636.
[19] Kali, R. (1999a) , ￿Endogenous Business Networks,￿ Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 615-636.
[20] Kali, R. (1999b) , ￿Business Groups, the Financial Market and Modernization,￿ Mimeo.
University of Arkansas.
[21] Khanna, T. (2000), ￿Business groups and Social Welfare in Emerging Markets : Existing
Evidence and Unanswered Questions￿, European Economic Review,4 4 ,p p .7 4 8 - 7 6 1 .
[22] Khanna, T. and Palepu, K. (1998a), ￿Is Group Aﬃliation Pro￿table in Emerging Mar-
kets? An Analysis of Indian Diversi￿ed Business Groups,￿ Harvard Business School
Working Paper 96-051, forthcoming in Journal of Finance.
32[23] Khanna, T. and Palepu, K. (1998d), ￿Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign In-
vestors and Corporate Governance,￿ NBER Working Paper 6955, Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts.
[24] Khanna, T. and J.W. Rivkin (1999), ￿Ties that bind business groups : Evidence from
Chile.￿ Mimeo. Harvard Business School.
[25] Khanna, T. and Yafeh, Y. (1999), ￿Business Groups and Risk Sharing Around the
World,￿ Mimeo. Harvard Business School.
[26] Khanna, T., Palepu, K. and Danielle Melito Wu (1998), ￿The House of Tata: The Next
Generation (A),￿ Case 9-798-037, Harvard Business School Publishing.
[27] Keister, L. (2000), Chinese Business Groups: The Structure and Impact of Inter￿rm
Relations during Economic Development, Oxford University Press.
[28] La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1999), ￿Corporate Ownership
Around the World,￿ Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 471-517.
[29] Lincoln, J. R., Gerlach, M.L. and Ahmadjian, C.L. (1996), ￿Keiretsu Networks and
Corporate Performance in Japan,￿ American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, pp. 67-88.
[30] Matsusaka, J. G. (2000) ￿Corporate Diversi￿cation, Value Maximization, and Organi-
zational Capabilities￿ Forthcoming in the Journal of Business.
[31] Morduch, J. (1999), ￿The Micro￿nance Promise￿, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.
37, No. 4, pp. 1564-1614.
[32] Nakatani, I. (1984), ￿The Economic Role of Financial Corporate Grouping,￿ in M. Aoki
(ed.) The Economic Analysis of the Japanese Firm (New York, North Holland).
[33] Pistor, K. (1999), ￿Law as a Determinant for Equity Market Development: The Ex-
perience of Transition Economies,￿ Forthcoming in The Value of Law in the Economic
Transition From Socialism edited by Murrell, P.
[34] Shin, H.H. and Park, Y. S. (1999), ￿Financing constraints and internal capital markets:
Evidence from Korean Chaebols,￿ Journal of Corporate Finance, 5, pp. 169-191.
33[35] Singh, A. (1995), ￿Corporate Financing Patterns In Industrializing Economies: A Com-
parative International Study,￿ Technical Paper No. 2, International Finance Corpora-
tion.
[36] Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A. (1981), ￿Credit Rationing in Markets With Imperfect Infor-
mation,￿ American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 3, pp. 393-410.
[37] Wolfenzon, D. (1999), ￿A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership,￿ Mimeo. University of
Michigan.
34Indifference curve 
of safe firms
Indifference curve 
of risky firms
Preference 
direction
Interest rate
Cross liability
γ
r
Figure 1
Figure 1:
35